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Summary Sentence: Jamie Morgenstern presents a talk as part of the ARC Colloquium series on Approximately Stable, School Optimal, and Student-Truthful Many-to-One Matchings (via Differential Privacy)
Full Summary: Jamie Morgenstern presents a talk as part of the ARC Colloquium series on Approximately Stable, School Optimal, and Student-Truthful Many-to-One Matchings (via Differential Privacy)
Jamie Morgenstern(Refreshments served in Klaus 2222 at 2 pm)
Title:
Approximately Stable, School Optimal, and Student-Truthful Many-to-One Matchings (via Differential Privacy)
Abstract:
We present a mechanism for computing asymptotically stable school optimal matchings, while guaranteeing that it is an asymptotic dominant strategy for every student to report their true preferences to the mechanism. Our main tool in this endeavor is differential privacy: we give an algorithm that coordinates a stable matching using differentially private signals, which lead to our truthfulness guarantee. This is the first setting in which it is known how to achieve nontrivial truthfulness guarantees for students when computing school-optimal matchings, assuming worst-case preferences (for schools and students) in large markets.
Joint work with Sampath Kannan, Aaron Roth and Zhiwei Steven Wu: SODA 2015.
